Purva Tranquillity best living place in East Bangalore
Comparative analysis of REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms for Efficiency, Effectiveness and Equity
1. Comparative analysis of REDD+ benefit
sharing mechanisms for Efficiency,
Effectiveness and Equity
Maria Brockhaus, Cecilia Luttrell, Grace Wong,
Pham T.T.,, L.N. Dung, J.S. Tjajadi,
L. Loft, and S. Assembe Mvondo
Warsaw, 18/11/2013
2. Presentation Outline
Definition of benefit sharing
Review of benefit sharing mechanisms in 13 countries
Discourses on effectiveness, efficiency and equity
Concluding thoughts
3. Some background
• REDD+ is moving through different phases,
• With introduction of performance based
payments, it becomes important to link MRV
systems to benefit (and cost) sharing systems
• Monitoring data gets more and more robust,
but payment mechanisms, clear rules, and
measures for performance are still lacking
4. What do we mean by
‘benefit sharing’
• Benefit sharing is the distribution of
direct and indirect net gains from the
implementation of REDD+
• Two types of direct benefits:
• Monetary gains from international
and national finance related to
REDD+
• Benefits associated with the
increased availability of forest
products & ecosystem services
• Indirect benefits e.g. improved
governance infrastructure provision
5. What is a BSM
• Range of institutional means: governance
structures and instruments that distribute
finance and other net benefits from REDD+
– Direct incentives e.g. cash transfers,
– Policy and governance processes e.g. tenure
clarification, law enforcement, agricultural
intensification
6. Benefits come with costs:
net benefits are what matter
• Direct financial outlays related to REDD+
(implementation and transaction costs)
• Costs arising from changes in forest land and
resource use (opportunity costs)
• Cost recovery (compensation) vs. the surplus
(REDD rent)
7. • Reviewed existing benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSMs) in
REDD+ and forest management in 13 countries
• Evaluated BSMs for their potential 3E (effectiveness,
efficiency and equity) outcomes, and risks
Global comparative analysis
Pham, T.T. et al. (2013)
8. Analysis of national REDD+ policies and processes in 13
countries since 2009
http://www.forestsclimatechange.org/global-comparative-study-
on-redd.html
9. • Only 4 countries (Vietnam, Indonesia, Brazil and Tanzania)
have national REDD+ programmes that regulate the
distribution of REDD+ finance
• BS tend to build upon existing models or practices in-country
• Conflicts of interest and governance issues have delayed
implementation of REDD+ policies
• Characterised by minimal interaction between sectors
• Many of the “enabling factors” identified as necessary for
achieving 3E BSMs are lacking in all countries
Key findings
10. BS proposals and policy at the
national level
National level-proposals & activities Proposals financial arrangements
Brazil No national policy to date; state & sub-
state projects define own BS
arrangements ; Incl. few direct PES
schemes
Public funding: Amazon Fund & Bolsa Verde;
Indonesia Min. of Forestry regulations (2009 &
2012) projects need to obtain
ministerial approval; number of
projects without approval
Contested Min of Forestry (2009)
regulations specifies % to gov. project
developers and communities; Presidential
Taskforce designing parallel funding
mechanism
Vietnam Draft REDD+ strategy: benefits to be
shared between communities,
organisations and local authorities
Provincial level PES trialled
UNREDD+ proposes a National Fund
overseen by multi-stakeholder body;
revenues according to provincial
performance. Projects moving away from an
expectation of a voluntary market
11. REDD+ projects and their proposed and
actual BSM in Tanzania
Project Details of BSMs
TFCG-
Kilosa &
Lindi
Dividends paid to village member of the village (under village by-laws); up-
front funds & individual payments based on the potential average avoided
emissions per year; village assemblies decide whether to use dividends on
community projects
Mpingo Acquiring land certificates; boundary clarification; assistance in selling
timber through FSC and land use and management plans. Originally the
project planned to pass on profits to communities after deducting costs but
this was controversial so now they are discussing a percentage arrangement
CARE Distribution of carbon revenues will use existing village savings and loan
systems. The rights to carbon will be negotiated between CARE and the
community through an exisiting intermediary organisation
13. Discourses on ‘who
should benefit’?
There are tradeoffs involved in these choice implied
by the different discourses which the implications
for design of BSMs
Effectiveness/efficiency vs. equity discourses
Effectiveness/efficiency = goal of emission
reductions
Equity = who has the right to benefit
14. Efficiency/Effectiveness discourse
REDD+ as a mechanism for paying forest users & owners to reduce emissions:
• Focus on emissions reductions
• Payments as incentive for those who change in behaviour
• Benefits should go to people providing these services
15. “REDD benefits should reward large-scale
industries/companies for reducing forest emissions”
Data from CIFOR’s GCS’ policy network analysis by Levania Santosa & Moira Moeliano (Indonesia), Maria
Fernanda Gebara & Shaozeng Zhang (Brazil)
16. Equity discourses
Equity discourses take a distributional perspective and ask who are the actors
who have the „right“ to benefit from REDD+:
• Focus on preventing unfair distributional results
• Strengthening moral and political legitimacy of REDD+ mechanism
17. Equity Discourse I:
Benefits should go to those
with legal rights
But no REDD+ country has legally
defined carbon rights
Will existing tenure rights be the legal
basis for REDD+ BS?
carbon rights not necessarily vested in
rights to land or trees?
Distinct from right to benefit from sale
Will state claim carbon rights?
Risk that those without formal rights
may lose out
18. Equity Discourse II:
Benefits should go to low
emitting forest stewards
Many of these are low-emission situations
No additionality
A possible solution is a baseline definition
based on future threats
19. Equity Discourse III:
Benefits should go to those
incurring costs
Compensate for implementation, transaction
and opportunity costs regardless of emission
reductions
In early stages of REDD+ implementation there
is a need to incentivize actors to get involved
Inputs are easier to define than to measure
emissions reductions
20. Equity Discourse IV:
Benefits should go to effective
facilitators of implementation
What is the ‘right’ proportion?
• to attract investors
• but prevent windfall profits?
Right for governments to retain some
revenue for incurring implementation and
transaction costs?
What‘s the exact level of costs occurring to
government?
21. Negotiating choices:
legitimacy of the process
Clarify objectives of national REDD+ implementation before designing BSMs
Clarity on objectives help to define who ‘should‘ benefit
Lack of clarity over what is the ‘competent agency’ with these decision
making powers
Legitimacy of the decision needs the decision to be made by those with:
• Legal mandate to make them
• Adherence to due process & to procedural rights
Requires a legitimate decision-making process and institutions
22. Some further reading:
Pham, T.T., Brockhaus, M., Wong, G., Dung, L.N.,
Tjajadi, J.S., Loft, L., Luttrell C. and Assembe Mvondo, S.,
2013. Approaches to benefit sharing: A preliminary
comparative analysis of 13 REDD+ countries. Working Paper
108. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
Luttrell, C., L. Loft, F. M. Gebara, D. Kweka, M. Brockhaus, A.
Angelsen and W. Sunderlin 2013. Who should benefit from
REDD+? Rationales and Realities. Ecology and Society. In
press.
Assembe-Mvondo, S., Brockhaus, M., Lescuyer, G., 2013.
Assessment of the Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equity of
Benefit-Sharing Schemes under Large-Scale Agriculture:
Lessons from Land Fees in Cameroon. European Journal of
Development Research 25, 641-656.
23. Acknowledgements
This work is part of the policy component of CIFOR’s global comparative study on REDD (GCS). The methods and guidelines used in
this research component were designed by Maria Brockhaus, Monica Di Gregorio and Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff. Parts of the
methodology are adapted from the research protocol for media and network analysis designed by COMPON (‘Comparing Climate
Change Policy Networks’).
Case leaders: Thuy Thu Pham (Nepal), Thuy Thu Pham & Moira Moeliono (Vietnam), Thuy Thu Pham and Guillaume Lestrelin
(Laos), Daju Resosudarmo & Moira Moeliono (Indonesia), Andrea Babon (PNG), Peter Cronkleton, Kaisa Korhonen-Kurki, Pablo
Pacheco (Bolivia), Mary Menton (Peru), Sven Wunder & Peter May (Brazil), Samuel Assembe & Jolien Schure (Cameroon), Samuel
Assembe (DRC), Salla Rantala (Tanzania), Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff (Mozambique), Suwadu Sakho-Jimbira & Houria Djoudi (Burkina
Faso), Arild Angelsen (Norway). Special thanks to our national partners from REDES, CEDLA, Libelula and DAR, REPOA, UEM, CODELT,
ICEL, ForestAction, CIEM, CERDA, Son La FD, UPNG, NRI-PNG, and UMB.
Thanks to contributors to case studies, analysis and review : Levania Santoso, Tim Cronin, Giorgio Indrarto, Prayekti Murharjanti, Josi
Khatarina, Irvan Pulungan, Feby Ivalerina, Justitia Rahman, Muhar Nala Prana, Caleb Gallemore (Indonesia), Nguyen Thi Hien,
Nguyen Huu Tho, Vu Thi Hien, Bui Thi Minh Nguyet, Nguyen Tuan Viet and Huynh Thu Ba (Vietnam), Dil Badhur, Rahul Karki, Bryan
Bushley, Naya Paudel (Nepal), Daniel McIntyre, Gae Gowae, Nidatha Martin, Nalau Bingeding, Ronald Sofe, Abel Simon (PNG), Walter
Arteaga, Bernado Peredo, Jesinka Pastor (Bolivia), Maria Fernanda Gebara, Brent Millikan, Bruno Calixto, Shaozeng Zhang (Brazil),
Hugo Piu, Javier Perla, Daniela Freundt, Eduardo Burga Barrantes, Talía Postigo Takahashi (Peru), Guy Patrice Dkamela, Felicien
Kengoum (Cameroon), Felicien Kabamba, Augustin Mpoyi, Angelique Mbelu (DRC), Demetrius Kweka, Therese Dokken, Rehema
Tukai, George Jambiya, Riziki Shemdoe, (Tanzania), Almeida Sitoe, Alda Salomão (Mozambique), Mathurin Zida, Michael Balinga
(Burkina Faso), Laila Borge (Norway).
Special thanks to Efrian Muharrom, Sofi Mardiah, Christine Wairata, Ria Widjaja-Adhi, Cecilia Luttrell, Frances Seymour, Lou Verchot,
Markku Kanninen, Elena Petkova, Arild Angelsen, Jan Boerner, Anne Larson, Martin Herold, Rachel Carmenta, Juniarta Tjajadi,
Cynthia Maharani
Editor's Notes
The first problem we faced with analyzing BS was to define what we were analyzing . We solved this by using a wide definition of BS as ‘the distribution of direct and indirect net gains from the implementation of REDD+’
We distinguish between two types of direct benefits:
First, the monetary gains from finance related to REDD and secondly the are benefits generated through the increased availability of forest products & services
In addition there are indirect benefits such as infrastructure provision and improved governance etc
We also took a broad definition of the term ‘benefit sharing mechanism’ in order to reflect the broad way the term is being used in REDD policies and practise, Thus we use it to refer to the ranges of institutional means, governance structures and instruments that distribute finance and other net benefits from REDD+
But an equally important part of looking at benefits is to consider costs as it is the NET benefits that matter
Again, there are conceptual distinctions to be made between the direct financial outlays related to REDD+ implementation
And the costs arising from benefits forgone by using forests in ways that reduce emissions i.e. the opportunity costs
Where we are working :
13 countries including Laos , which is not yet on the map
Our first step was to try to describe the BS proposals and policies at the mnationa leevel – I will not dwell on this now but apart perhaps from in Brazil, we find little clarity in any of the countries over the institutional governance arrangement for REDD+ finance transfer and many countries have a number of alternative proposals on the table. This mean that that many REDD+ projects are operating in insecure legal and policy framework and that that existing benefit sharing arrangements could be subject to upheaval once the national level policy is formalised.
We have also described th range of BS mech we are finding at the project leevel. This eaxmple of of 3 projects in Tanzania shw the different wasy which BS Is being dealt with ranging from individual payments in the TFCG project to using existing loan mechanisms in the CARE project
Ok so now I will focus one of the questions dominating the benefit sharing debate who should receive the benefits associated with REDD+.
There are a number of discourses around this questions, and what we did was to explore some o the tradeoffs involved in each discourse and the implications these bring for the design of the benefit sharing mechanisms
A broad distinction can be made between effectiveness/ efficiency discourses on the one hand and equity discourses on the other.
The „Efficiency / Effectiveness discourse“: suggests that benefits should be used as an incentive to bring about a reduction in emissions and should go to the actors providing these reductions.
One implication of this discourse is that REDD+ revenue might end up be used predominantly to reward large-scale actors for reducing carbon emissions—as in many cases these are the current dominant emitters
Interviews with national-level actors in Brazil and Indonesia show a divergence of views over this. In Indonesia, the idea that REDD benefits should reward large-scale industry was strongly supported by government and private sector respondents, and around half of the NGO/research and donor respondents. In Brazil however , a minority of government and NGO/research respondents agreed with this and there was concern from many that illegal operators would be rewarded as much of the deforestation is carried out by large landowners who do not comply with regulations.
Equity-related discourses around BS have therefore emerged from the concern that a focus only on effectiveness and efficiency could result in unfair incentives.
We identified four main strands in the equity discourse
A dominant strand is that benefits should be distributed to those with the legal rights (whether statuatory or customary) to those benefits. However in most countries and projects we looked at establishing these legal rights is not straightforward. In none of the countries have the carbon right been clearly legally defined
Some commentators assume that existing land and forest tenure and existing policy instruments for sharing benefits from the forests will serve as the basis for allocating payments for carbon emission reductions. But this assumption may be problematic: owning land or trees does not necessarily mean a legal right to benefit from carbon sequestration. There are at least 2 further aspects to consider :
The first is that the property rights to sequestered carbon, does not necessarily coincide with the rights over the physical resource within which it is contained
The second is that property right to sequestered carbon may be distinct from the right to benefit from selling carbon credits.
And interestingly in the few examples where carbon rights have been legally clarified (e.g., New Zealand until 2008) and the state of Amazonas and Acre in Brazil) the carbon rights did not reflect existing land and forest tenure but were vested in the state.
In Tanzania, for example, the majority of REDD+ projects are taking place on land registered as Village Forest Reserves, which means that there is no legal requirement for the income from these projects to go to the government. However despite the recent shift of control of NR to communities some, particularly at the national level continue to perceive natural resources as nationally owned goods and there are suggestions that carbon rights may be claimed by the state
Another strand of the equity discourse is that REDD+ benefits should not only go to those actors that have been causing high emissions but also to indigenous groups or other users that have a record of responsible forest management. By taking this approach, a community whose customary rights are not legally recognised but that has been protecting the forests would have strong claims to benefits from REDD+. The effectiveness dilemma of this is that in many of these low-emission situations, additionality cannot be proved
A third strong discourse is that the actors who shoulder costs should receive benefits.
This debate reflects concerns to ensure that actors are compensated for inputs regardless of the emission reductions that they are directly responsible for. And this concern is reflected in the design of many emerging benefit sharing arrangements at the project level partly due to the recogistio need to give actors upfront incentives in order to get them involved.
Finally, there is a discourse that a proportion of REDD+ benefits should be shared with those actors that are essential for facilitating the implementation of REDD+ , for example project developers and government. However, the determination of the proportion of the benefits that should accrue to these actors is an area of contestation. The challenge is to ensure that project implementers receive enough incentive to guarantee effective implementation, while at the same time guarding against them getting windfall profits
This question also relates to the rights of governments to retain some revenue to cover ‘admissable costs that they have incurred, such as setting up MRV and enforcement systems (this retention practise is common in natural resource management)
Our exploration of the discourses show that emphasis on either effectiveness and efficiency or equity has significant implications for the design of benefit sharing mechanisms. Managing the tradeoffs between the different objectives which the dsicourses reflect requires clarity concerning i) the primary objective of REDD+ and ii) the degree to which co-benefits should and/or can be paid for by REDD+.
However, these fundamental questions have yet to be resolved at both the national and project levels What is clear is that a common constraint is a lack of clarity about which is the competent agency to make these decisions on benefit sharing arrangements. And this is potentialy is stalling the development of REDD+ implementation.
For example, in Indonesia, the REDD+ benefit sharing regulation developed by the Ministry of Forestry has been challenged by the Ministry of Finance, which contends that the Ministry of Forestry does not have the legal authority to make fiscal decisions. At the same time, the REDD+ Task Force is developing parallel proposals for benefit sharing connected to Norwegian funding for REDD+.
Overcoming this requires a process that brings legitimacy to any decisions that are made. We are now beginning in WP5 to think about what it means to ensure the legitimacy of process for making decisions about benefit sharing design.
Another area to explore is how to design BSM in a suboptimal policy context. For example, as getting legal clarity over carbon rights may not be realistic in the short term, the benefit sharing mechanism might need to rely on specific contracts. On the other hand giving too much attention to minor details of the design of benefit sharing mechanisms before fundamental questions (such as the due process for making decisions and which bodies have the legal right to do so) are resolved can be problematic.